Online Newsroom: Op-Eds
Financial Times
April 26, 2011
By Ahmed Zewail
As I was leaving Cairo after Hosni Mubarak stepped down, I asked Esraa, a young woman who was one of the leaders of the revolution: “What was your objective?” She said, “taghier al nezam”, a change of the system. The Egyptians brought down the head of the system, but not the system itself. That is the challenge now.
Egypt’s revolution, like Tunisia’s, represents a model for change in the Middle East. These societies are not fragmented by tribal or sectarian conflicts. Despite differences of faith or even the occasional collisions between them, Egypt is united. In contrast, the second model for revolutions is that of Yemen, Libya and others in the making. In these cases, unfortunately, tribal and sectarian conflicts may lead to chaos and civil war, ultimately dragging the Middle East backward into conflict and fanaticism, not forward.
To avert this, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia cannot be allowed to fail. Egypt is the key. With 85m people, it is the largest country in the region and the heart of the Arab world. Making sure it succeeds is essential for the spread of democracy and stability of the world’s energy supply as well as for peace in the region. What can be done?
New York Times
April 4, 2011
By Ali Gomaa
Grand Mufti of Egypt
LAST month, Egyptians approved a referendum on constitutional amendments that will pave the way for free elections. The vote was a milestone in Egypt’s emerging democracy after a revolution that swept away decades of authoritarian rule. But it also highlighted an issue that Egyptians will grapple with as they consolidate their democracy: the role of religion in political life.
The vote was preceded by the widespread use of religious slogans by supporters and opponents of the amendments, a debate over the place of religion in Egypt’s future Constitution and a resurgence in political activity by Islamist groups. Egypt is a deeply religious society, and it is inevitable that Islam will have a place in our democratic political order. This, however, should not be a cause for alarm for Egyptians, or for the West.
Egypt’s religious tradition is anchored in a moderate, tolerant view of Islam. We believe that Islamic law guarantees freedom of conscience and expression (within the bounds of common decency) and equal rights for women. And as head of Egypt’s agency of Islamic jurisprudence, I can assure you that the religious establishment is committed to the belief that government must be based on popular sovereignty.
Al-Ahram Weekly
March 22, 2011
By Abdel Moneim Said
My first experience with revolution was listening to grownups whispering about the 1952 Revolution. Although my childhood understanding of that great event was limited, I had already become an avid supporter, even as many people around me continued to speak with admiration about Saad Zaghloul and Mustafa El-Nahhas. The Suez War of 1956 fired my enthusiasm for the immortal leader Gamal Abdel-Nasser and his disciples in the Free Officers movement. Although there were some who questioned a victory that led to an occupation and the opening of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, the words of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal on the nationalisation of the canal and victory, be it political or military, were sufficient to keep my ardour alive.
The turning point came during my first years of secondary school when my history professor gave us the assignment of writing a short research paper on a major historical event. Mine was the French Revolution. After ploughing through several books on the subject, what struck me most was the difference between the romantic beginnings of the revolution and subsequent realities. There it opened with the exciting fall of a corrupt king, a foolish queen and a wealthy ruling elite against the backdrop of the storming of the Bastille, the symbol of oppression and tyranny.
However, the rosiness faded as guillotines severed the heads of the supporters of the ancien régime and then turned their blades on the heads of the leaders of the new order who had transformed a budding democracy into the Bonapartist state whose defeat worked to restore the corrupt monarchy to the throne. What happened in France afterward is not the issue here. The point is that the revolution that had succeeded in uprooting tyranny somehow lost its enthralling glimmer.
Al-Ahram Weekly
March 22, 2011
By Arne Klau
In spring 1989, Turkish economist Timur Kuran wrote a widely noticed academic article, Sparks and Prairie Fires -- A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution, using economic tools to explain political revolutions. The revolutions Kuran considered were those in France (1789), Russia (1917) and Iran (1979), not knowing that his paper subject would attract additional interest through the revolutions in Eastern Europe in that very same year.
One of the main assumptions of Kuran's paper was the distinction between the private opinion individuals have and their publicly expressed opinion. In other words: people may conceal their true opinion about the political regime they live in. Why should they? Basically, because their behaviour comes at a cost. Expressing dissatisfaction with a government, particularly in unfree societies, may be punished with anything from social pressure over prison to torture, which is well known.
On the other hand, concealing one's true opinion brings with it long-time psychological costs as a result of being dishonest. Individuals will minimise the costs of their behaviour. Under a repressive, but stable regime, most people will find it prudent to remain outwardly loyal to the existing order. Their silence makes society appear stable, even though it may find itself in the throes of revolution.
Al-Ahram Weekly
March 22, 2011
By Andalib Fahmy
In the wake of the 25 January Revolution, political debate has taken over Cairo, with 30 years of political stagnation giving way to the conviction that Egyptians are finally free to shape their own destiny. Suddenly, people have begun to realise that political awareness should be fostered rather than smothered, and political activists have taken the initiative to raise awareness, create new political parties and help young people to voice their demands.
According to 27-year-old Noha Saleh, "for the first time in Egypt political activists of different backgrounds and orientations have been able to speak openly about the corruption of Egyptian politics and the weaknesses of the country's constitution, along with other topics that were for a long time considered to be taboo."
"This has encouraged me to read up about politics in Egypt, and I now think that the so- called freedom of speech we were encouraged to think we had over the past 30 years was in fact fake. In the wake of the revolution, people should aim to be more politically involved, and they should become politically literate so that no one will be able to buy their votes. People should read the different electoral programmes and choose the best candidates on the basis of them."
The Guardian
March 21, 2011
By Tarek El-Bishry
Head of Egypt's Constitutional Committee
In January this year time caught up with Hosni Mubarak. For decades, all visible opposition in Egypt had been blocked. The country's political parties' activities had been curtailed. Professional federations had been disbanded. Labour unions were controlled by regime lackeys. Government departments and universities had their political security controlled by the police. As a result Mubarak's regime was incapable of addressing the challenges faced by the community. Perhaps inevitably, renewed popular forces emerged that swept him away.
However, every regime has a legitimacy. An assault against the regime means an assault against the legitimacy on which it is based. This creates a need for a new legitimacy, responsive to the demands of the new system and its political and social relations. This is why the formulation of a new constitution following the demise of Egypt's old regime was a necessity.
The revolutionary force that overthrew Mubarak was a popular movement. It did not have the organisational and institutional leadership to take power and replace the regime of the president, and so this fell to the army. In other words, political power was transferred to the supreme military council on the basis of revolutionary, not constitutional, legitimacy.